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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax evasion is a central problem for many countries 
around the world. It has been estimated that 
European shadow economies account for about 22% 
of the total economic activity with clear implications 
for tax loss every year (Murphy, 2012; Schneider et 
al., 2015). Policy makers and administrative officials 
are therefore engaged in countering tax evasion and 
erosion with a variety of measures (Alm, 2012). 
Examples of traditional initiatives are audit 
programs that use withholding tax, payments 
through the banking system and third-party sources 
of information. Examples of non-standard measures 
are policies that emphasize the assistance services 
for taxpayers, the importance of taxes in providing 
public services and the simplification of the tax 
system and modes of payment.  
The use of a cash flow base for calculating 
corporate taxes is considered a way of simplifying 
the tax system to overcome the limitations of the 
most widely used income corporate tax. There have 
been several experiences with cash-flow taxation in 
many countries all over the world (e.g., European 
Commission, 2015) and other initiatives are being 
taken into consideration by policy makers. For 
example, the UK government’s Making Tax Digital 
transformation programme has recently introduced 
the cash flow basis for calculating profits to eligible 
unincorporated property businesses (HM Revenue 
and Customs, 2017). Taxation based on cash flows 
has also been introduced for small businesses in 
Italy, as already applies for the self-employed (Act 
n°232, 2016). In particular, as from 1 January 2017, 
partnerships with annual revenues not exceeding a 
specific amount (400,000 euros for service 
companies and 700,000 euros for other companies) 
can pay taxes on cash-flow accounting. The 
importance of the cash flow element in the 
corporate tax system has also been underlined 
recently in the US by the discussion of a proposal to 
introduce the so-called destination-based cash-flow 
tax (e.g, Auerbach et al., 2017; Cui, 2017; Patel and 
McClelland, 2017). Although the cash-flow tax and 
its variants are not new for academics (e.g, Brown, 
1948; Meade Committee, 1978; King, 1987; Edwards, 
2003) and for legislators of several countries (e.g., 
European Commission, 2015; Department of 
Treasury, IRS, 2016), the above-mentioned examples 
testify to a renewed interest in cash flows in fiscal 
policy.  
This study examines how the operating cash 
flow net of cash from investing activities (CFINV) is 
correlated with the net income using a sample of 
189 Italian listed firms from 2011 to 2015. CFINV 
and net income were used as proxy variables of the 
cash-flow tax base and the income tax base 
respectively. More specifically, three main research 
questions are addressed in this study. (1) Is the 
amount of CFINV similar to the amount of net 
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income and which factors can explain this 
difference? (2) Is CFINV correlated to net income and 
to other variables that may affect its value? (3) Is the 
relationship between corporate tax burden and firm 
profitability similar to the relationship between 
corporate tax burden and CFINV? These issues were 
explored with the aim of enriching the debate on 
corporate tax burden and cash flow for an 
assessment of a hypothetical substitution of the 
income tax base with a cash-flow tax base. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: the second section develops the research 
questions, the third section describes the sample 
selection and the survey methodology, the fourth 
section reports on the research findings and the last 
section presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Although the cash-flow tax occupies a prominent 
role in the alternative solutions to the traditional 
corporate income tax, the relationship between the 
cash-flow tax base and the income tax base appears 
to have been only partially explored in the research 
literature. Most studies that have examined the 
corporate tax burden have focussed on several 
issues related to corporate income tax. For example, 
corporate tax burden has been examined in relation 
to the cost of capital (Rao and Stevens, 2006), the 
impact of foreign operations (Bauman and 
Schadewald, 2001), Tobin’s Q ratio (Burton and 
Cathey, 2005), earnings management (Cook et al., 
2008), firm value (Kubota and Takehara, 2010), tax 
haven operations (Jaafar and Thornton, 2015) and 
factors affecting the corporate tax rate, such as firm 
profitability, firm size, capital structure and asset 
mix (e.g., Janssen, 2005; Liu and Cao, 2007; Delgado 
et al., 2014; Fernández-Rodríguez and Martínez-
Arias, 2014; Dyreng et al., 2017). Apart from the use 
of the operating cash flow as the denominator of the 
effective tax rate (e.g., Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Richardson and Lanis, 
2007), no explicit mention can be found in the 
research literature about the operating cash flow 
and/or CFINV as a determinant of the corporate tax 
burden. Specific attention to various measures of 
cash flow can be found in several studies that have 
outlined the cash-flow tax and its variants (e.g, 
Brown, 1948; Meade Committee, 1978; King 1987; 
Shome and Schutte, 1993; Edwards, 2003; Zee, 2007; 
Boadway et al., 2016; Auerbach et al., 2017; Cui, 
2017; Patel and McClelland, 2017). However, 
research to date has tended to focus on the 
evaluation of the properties of cash-flow taxation 
(Auerbach et al., 2017), addressing a series of 
implementation difficulties (Cui, 2017) and 
theoretical effects (Boadway et al., 2016). 
Unlike previous research, this paper seeks to 
contribute to the debate by empirically analysing 
some basic aspects of the relationship between 
proxies of the income tax base and the cash-flow tax 
base. More specifically, CFINV was used as a proxy 
of the tax base under the most common version of 
cash-flow taxation. One of the best known proposed 
versions of the cash-flow tax is a real transactions-
based cash-flow tax where the tax base is the net 
cash inflow of transactions from the sale of goods 
and services minus current and capital expenses 
(Meade Committee, 1978; European Commission, 
2015). CFINV was then compared with net income 
after tax (NIAT) since the amount of CFINV that was 
available on databanks is computed after the 
payment of taxes.  
On the basis of this scenario and as mentioned 
above, three issues were examined in the present 
study. 
The first issue we explored is the difference 
between the amount of CFINV and NIAT. A negative 
value of the difference between CFINV and NIAT 
(DIFF) reveals ceteris paribus that firms could benefit 
from a hypothetical substitution of the tax base, 
whereas a positive value could disadvantage firms. 
The average value of DIFF was then used as a binary 
variable in the logistic regression model in order to 
examine factors affecting its value. 
Second, we analysed how CFINV is correlated 
with NIAT. It is reasonable to expect a positive 
relationship since a firm ordinarily generates cash 
from its sales and makes payments for expenses 
even if CFINV is computed by including cash from 
investing activities. Some references concerning the 
positive association between the contemporaneous 
and predictive relationships between measures of 
cash flow and earnings may be found in studies that 
have investigated the role of cash flow and earnings 
in forecast accuracy (e.g., Bowen et al., 1986; Arnold 
et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1998; Lorek and Willinger, 
2009; Farshadfar and Monem, 2013; Call et al., 2013; 
Jung, 2015). A significant positive correlation 
between CFINV and NIAT would suggest ceteris 
paribus that a cash-flow tax base, as proxied by 
CFINV, is associated with a proportional amount of 
net income.  
The third issue we examined concerns the 
relationship between corporate tax burden under 
income taxation and NIAT and between the same 
corporate tax burden and CFINV. Firm profitability is 
considered the main determinant of corporate tax 
burden since profitable firms pay taxes every year, 
whereas firms that do not have high profits pay 
fewer taxes or none in case of losses. We, therefore, 
expected a positive correlation between corporate 
tax burden under income taxation and firm 
profitability. Given the positive relationship, our 
next objective is to verify the existence of a similar 
relationship between corporate tax burden under 
income taxation and CFINVA. A positive correlation 
would signal that the corporate tax burden is also 
justified by the presence of CFINV.  
Based on extant studies, the above-mentioned 
relations were explored using various proxy 
variables of firm characteristics, such as firm 
profitability, firm size, leverage and asset mix. These 
factors were examined by numerous prior studies 
with an emphasis on their role in influencing 
corporate tax burden. 
As mentioned above, firm profitability is 
considered a factor affecting corporate tax burden 
since profitable firms pay higher taxes than 
unprofitable firms under income taxation. More 
specifically, although some studies have found that 
higher firm profitability is associated with a lower 
effective tax rate (Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Noor et 
al., 2010), most of the research confirmed a positive 
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relationship (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Liu and 
Cao, 2007; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Wu et al., 
2012; Delgado et al., 2014; Fernandez-Rodriguez and 
Martinez-Arias, 2012, 2014; Lazǎr, 2014).  
Firm size is considered one of the most 
important factors affecting the corporate tax 
burden. Several studies have found a negative 
correlation between firm size and the effective tax 
rate (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998, Derashid and 
Zhang, 2003; Richardson and Lanis, 2007) in 
accordance with the political power theory (Salamon 
and Siegfried, 1977) suggesting that large firms have 
more resources to achieve optimal tax savings. On 
the other hand, a positive correlation was also 
documented (Omer et al., 1993; Noor et al., 2010; 
Delgado et al., 2014) in accordance with the political 
cost theory (Zimmerman, 1983) that posits a higher 
tax burden for larger firms because of the greater 
public scrutiny and regulatory actions by 
government. No association between firm size and 
the effective tax rate (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Feeny et al., 2005; Liu and Cao, 2007; Lazǎr, 2014) 
and mixed results were also found (Wu et al., 2012; 
Fernandez-Rodriguez and Martinez-Arias, 2014; 
Delgado, 2014). 
Firm leverage has been identified by 
numerous studies as a major explanatory variable 
of corporate tax burden. Empirical findings 
revealed a negative correlation between the 
effective tax rate and leverage because of the tax 
deductibility of interest payments (Stickney and 
McGee, 1982; Fernández-Rodríguez, 2012; Liu and 
Cao, 2007; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Noor et al., 
2010), though a positive association (Feeny et al., 
2005; Janssen, 2005) and inconclusive results were 
also found (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). In such a 
context, it is worth mentioning that a large part of 
the empirical research has documented an inverse 
relation between firm profitability and leverage 
according to the Pecking order theory that suggests 
that firms prefer funds generated internally, then 
the issuing of debt and lastly the issuing of new 
shares (e.g., Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Baskin, 1989; Allen, 
1993; Fama and French, 2002; Panno, 2003; Tong 
and Green, 2005; Bharath et al., 2009; Lemmon and 
Zender, 2010; Al Manaseer et al., 2011; Mazen, 
2012). 
Lastly, firms’ asset mix is usually included in 
the analysis of factors affecting corporate tax 
burden. Asset mix, as proxied by capital intensity 
and/or inventory intensity, can affect the corporate 
tax burden because of the income tax deductibility 
of depreciation that allows firms to recover the cost 
of the certain property. Empirical evidence suggests 
that firms with higher capital intensity, as measured 
by fixed assets divided by total assets, tend to have 
a lower effective tax rate (Stickney and McGee, 1982; 
Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Derashid and Zhang, 
2003; Plesko, 2003; Janssen, 2005; Adhikari et al., 
2006; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Lazǎr, 2014). A 
positive relationship between capital intensity and 
the effective tax rate (Wu et al., 2007, 2012), no 
association (Liu and Cao, 2007) and mixed results 
were also found (Fernandez-Rodriguez and 
Martinez-Arias, 2012, 2014). 
 
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGIES 
 
We examined a sample made up of Italian listed 
firms for the years 2011-2015. We manually 
collected consolidated financial statement data from 
it.reuters.com. Although various databases are 
available, this website provides information about 
cash flow measures that are not available elsewhere. 
We excluded firms with missing data, banks and 
insurance companies. On the basis of these selection 
criteria, the sample includes 189 firms with positive 
or with negative values of income taxes (ITAX) 
reported in the consolidated statement of income. 
ITAX includes two main corporate taxes. Italian 
corporate entities are subject to a corporate income 
tax (IRES) and to a regional tax on productive 
activities (IRAP). The IRES taxable base is the net 
income before taxes (NIBT) adjusted for tax 
accounting rules (as from 2017 the tax rate is 24%, 
whereas the previous tax rate was 27.5%). The IRAP 
taxable base approximately consists of the 
company’s gross margin in its income statements 
(the standard tax rate is 3.9%). Firms included in our 
sample operate in various industries: basic materials 
(2.65%), consumer goods (22.75%), consumer services 
(11.11%), financials (7.41%), health care (4.23%), 
industrials (26.46%), oil & gas (3.17%), technology 
(8.99%), telecommunications (3.17) and utilities 
(10.05%).  
Firm-specific variables used for exploring the 
relations between CFINV and NIAT are denoted by 
proxies for firm profitability, firm size, leverage 
and asset mix. More specifically, ROTA, ROA and 
ROS are measures of firm profitability. ROTA is 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by 
total assets, ROA is the NIAT divided by total 
assets and ROS is the return on sales measured by 
EBIT divided by total revenues. We included in the 
regression analyses the asset turnover ratio 
(ATURN), defined as total revenues divided by total 
assets, in order to have a measure expressing firm 
efficiency. As a measure of the asset mix, we used 
current assets divided by total assets (CATA). LEV 
is the debt divided by total assets ratio and LNA is 
the natural logarithm of total assets as proxies of 
leverage and firm size respectively. These variables 
were computed as the mean during the period 
2011-2015 and jointly or separately used in 
regression analyses to avoid multicollinearity 
problems. 
The first issue we explore is the difference 
between the amount of CFINV and NIAT (DIFF). 
DIFF was computed yearly for firm i from 2011 to 
2015 in order to ascertain for how many years 
CFINV was positive and greater than NIAT. The 
relationship between CFINV and NIAT was then 
explored using the average value of DIFF (MDIFF) 
for firm i as the binary dependent variable in the 
logistic regression model (1). More specifically, the 
logistic regression involved the binary dependent 
variable MDIFF with the probability between 0 and 
1 that the dependent variable will occur (firms with 
a positive MDIFF=1; firms with a negative MDIFF=0) 
and β
p
, as the pth parameter of the logistic model 
obtained by the method of maximum likelihood. 
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The logistic regression has the following general form: 
 
MDIFF𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ROTA𝑖 + 𝛽2 ROS𝑖 + 𝛽3 ATURN𝑖 + 𝛽4 CATA𝑖 + 𝛽5 LEV𝑖 +𝛽6 LNA𝑖 (1) 
 
where: MDIFF is the average value of the 
difference between the amount of CFINV and NIAT, 
ROTA is earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by total assets, ROS is the return on sales 
measured by EBIT divided by total revenues, ATURN 
is the asset turnover measured by total revenues 
divided by total assets, CATA is current assets 
divided by total assets, LEV is the debt divided by 
total assets ratio and LNA is the natural logarithm of 
total assets.  
The second issue we analysed is the correlation 
between CFINV and NIAT. We preliminarily 
estimated the correlation coefficient between CFINV 
and NIAT (CORR) over the period 2011-2015 for firm 
i and the average value for the 189 firms in the 
sample was computed using Fisher's z 
transformation defined as ½ ln[(1+r
i
)/(1-r
i
)], where ln 
is the natural logarithm and r
i
 is the correlation 
coefficient (CORR) for firm i. The relationship 
between the average value of CFINV divided by total 
assets (CFINVA) and NIAT divided by total assets 
(ROA) for firm i was then examined using the 
regression analysis based on the ordinary least 
squares (OLS regression). We used CFINVA as the 
dependent variable and ROA as the independent 
variable together with various firm-specific variables 
that can explain the above-mentioned relationship. 
The OLS regression has the following general form: 
 
CFINVA𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ROA𝑖 + 𝛽2 ROS𝑖 + 𝛽3 ATURN𝑖 + 𝛽4 CATA𝑖 + 𝛽5 LEV𝑖 + 𝛽6 LNA𝑖 (2) 
 
where: CFINVA is CFINV divided by total assets 
and ROA is the NIAT divided by total assets. All 
remaining terms are as previously defined.  
The third issue we examined concerns the 
relationship between corporate tax burden, NIAT 
and CFINV. The inclusion of firms in the sample with 
positive or negative values of ITAX limited the use of 
some proxy variables of corporate tax burden. More 
specifically, the most frequent proxy variable used 
in the studies on the determinants of the corporate 
tax burden is the average effective tax rate. Although 
alternative measures have been used by researchers, 
the effective tax rate is generally defined as the 
amount of tax paid divided by NIBT (e.g., Plesko, 
2003; Spooner, 1986; Fullerton, 1983; Stickney, 
1979; Nicodeme, 2001). However, the possibility that 
ITAX and measures of net income assume positive 
or negative values makes it difficult to interpret the 
effective tax rate. For example, as already noted 
(Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Adhikari et al., 2006), 
the effective tax rate could be positive with a 
negative ITAX (in case of tax refund) and a negative 
NIAT, even if firms do not pay taxes. Analogous 
distortions occur when the effective tax rate 
assumes negative values because of the negative and 
positive values of the numerator or the denominator 
of this ratio. The corporate tax burden was, 
therefore, measured in our study by dividing the 
amount of ITAX reported in the consolidated 
statement of income by the total assets and its 
average value (TAXA) was then computed for 5 years 
from 2011 to 2015. We used TAXA as the dependent 
variable for firm i in three regression analyses 
estimated using the OLS regression of the following 
general form. In model (1), ROA and CFINVA were 
considered jointly, whereas in models (4) and (5) 
they were analysed separately in order to distinguish 
the individual contributions of ROA and CFINVA. 
 
TAXA𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ROA𝑖 + 𝛽2 ROS𝑖 + 𝛽3 ATURN𝑖 + 𝛽4 LEV𝑖 +𝛽5 LNA𝑖 +𝛽6 CFINVA𝑖 (3) 
 
TAXA𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 CFINVA𝑖 + 𝛽2 ROS𝑖 + 𝛽3 ATURN𝑖 + 𝛽4 LEV𝑖 +𝛽5 LNA𝑖 (4) 
 
TAXA𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ROA𝑖 + 𝛽2 ROS𝑖 + 𝛽3 ATURN𝑖 + 𝛽4 LEV𝑖 +𝛽5 LNA𝑖 (5) 
 
where: TAXA is the corporate tax burden as 
measured by ITAX divided by the amount of total 
assets. All remaining terms are as previously 
defined.  
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix related 
to the variables involved in the above-mentioned 
regression analyses. The overall results suggest the 
absence of a multicollinearity problem for the 
variables used in the models, as confirmed by the 
value of the variance inflation factor (VIF) shown in 
the table notes.  
 
Table 1. Correlation matrix for independent variables 
 
 
CFINVA ROA ROTA ROS ATURN CATA LEV LNA 
CFINVA 1 
  
 
  
  
ROA 0.4697 1 
 
 
  
  
ROTA 0.485 0.9257 1  
  
  
ROS 0.1749 0.3317 0.3708 1 
  
  
ATURN 0.2142 0.2174 0.2584 0.2196 1 
 
  
CATA 0.0541 0.0937 0.1237 0.1446 0.4707 1   
LEV 0.0381 -0.1884 -0.1294 0.0097 -0.2363 -0.1644 1  
LNA 0.2219 0.3328 0.299 0.1475 -0.0706 -0.2952 -0.0746 1 
Note: VIF ranges from 1.090 for the LEV coefficient to 1.580 for the ROA coefficient.  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The descriptive statistics of DIFF and the variables 
used in the regression models from 2011 to 2015 
are presented in panel A and in panel B of Table 2 
respectively. As reported in panel B, the analysis 
revealed that CFINVA (mean = 0.014; 
median = 0.019) is on average higher than ROA 
(mean = 0.006; median = 0.011). Moreover, three 
main results emerge from an examination of DIFF. 
First, as presented in panel A, there are 50.69% firm-
year observations with a positive value of DIFF 
(50.69% = 17.78% plus 23.17% and 9.74% of firm-year 
observations) during the period from 2011 to 2015. 
Second, as shown in panel A, there are 40.95% of 
firm-year observations (17.78% plus 23.17% firm-
year observations) with a positive amount of CFINV 
greater than the amount of NIAT. Ceteris paribus, 
such a result suggests that firms could be 
disadvantaged in these cases by moving from an 
income tax to a cash-flow tax. Third, as reported in 
panel B, the analysis revealed a low average 
correlation between CFINV and NIAT (CORR = 0.273) 
estimated for firm i during the period 2011-2015. In 
other words, CFINV and NIAT are essentially 
independent if we limit the analysis to the 
correlation coefficient CORR. 
Table 3 presents the results of the logistic 
regression according to model (1). First, the negative 
coefficient of ROTA suggests that the probability of 
having a “firm with a positive MDIFF” response 
(MDIFF = 1) increases as ROTA decreases. The 
existence of a negative association between MDIFF 
and ROTA may be explained by the role that EBIT has 
in decreasing, ceteris paribus, the amount of NIAT 
used for the computation of DIFF. Second, the 
regression results show a positive association 
between DIFF and firm leverage, as measured by LEV. 
This is probably related to the inverse relationship 
between firm profitability and leverage outlined by 
several studies that have confirmed the validity of the 
Pecking order theory, suggesting that profitable firms 
prefer funds generated internally, then the issuing of 
debt and lastly the issuing of new shares. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of selected variables for firm i over the period 2011-2015 
 
Panel A 
 
Positive NIAT Negative NIAT Positive NIAT Negative NIAT 
 
Firm-year observations (%) DIFF > 0 (%) 
Positive CFINV 47.41% 17.78% 23.17% > 0 1 
Negative CFINV 17.67% 17.14% 0 9.74% > 0 
Panel B 
 
Mean Median 10th percentile 90th percentile St. deviation 
TAXA 0.013 0.010 -0.001 0.033 0.016 
CFINVA 0.014 0.019 -0.037 0.067 0.077 
ROA 0.006 0.011 -0.058 0.074 0.082 
ROTA 0.031 0.032 -0.040 0.112 0.084 
ROS -0.155 0.052 -0.165 0.190 1.660 
ATURN 0.692 0.678 0.177 1.167 0.398 
CATA 0.448 0.423 0.174 0.740 0.214 
LEV 0.313 0.297 0.089 0.576 0.183 
CORR 0.273(1) 0.330 -0.884 1.279 
 
Notes: (1) average value for 189 firms computed using Fisher's z transformation defined as ½ ln[(1+r
i
)/(1-r
i
)] where ln is the 
natural logarithm and r
i
 is the correlation coefficient between CFINV and NIAT for firm i. 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression results of MDIFF on various firm characteristics 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z p-value  
const -0.55539 0.870246 -0.6382 0.52334  
ROTA -17.2336 3.90212 -4.4165 0.00001 *** 
ROS 0.150447 0.120863 1.2448 0.21322  
ATURN 0.606469 0.512581 1.1832 0.23674  
CATA -0.394128 0.975469 -0.4040 0.68618  
LEV 3.11595 1.06805 2.9174 0.00353 *** 
LNA 0.00106949 0.0746204 0.0143 0.98856  
Notes: Adjusted R2 = 0.135; *** Significant at the 0.01 level.** Significant at the 0.05 level.* Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression 
analysis according to model (2). The research 
findings reveal a significant positive association 
between CFINVA and ROA confirming our 
expectation about the relationship between CFINV 
and NIAT. Ceteris paribus, this result suggests that 
the cash-flow tax base, as proxied by CFINV, is 
associated with a proportional amount of net 
income. Regression results also show a positive 
relationship between CFINVA and ATURN, 
suggesting that a high level of firm efficiency, as 
measured by the asset turnover ratio, allows firms to 
increase the generation of CFINV. A positive 
contribution to CFINVA was, moreover, due to the 
firm’s leverage as measured by LEV, confirming the 
role that leverage has in increasing DIFF, as 
previously highlighted on the basis of model (1).  
 
Table 4. OLS regression results of CFINVA on various firm characteristics 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p-value  
const -0.0553683 0.0262629 -2.1082 0.03638 ** 
ROA 0.411931 0.0686158 6.0034 <0.00001 *** 
ROS -0.00113719 0.00321458 -0.3538 0.72393  
ATURN 0.0340451 0.0145653 2.3374 0.02051 ** 
CATA -0.00286969 0.0276065 -0.1039 0.91732  
LEV 0.0711371 0.028181 2.5243 0.01245 ** 
LNA 0.00320333 0.00226359 1.4152 0.15873  
Notes: Adjusted R2 = 0.244; *** Significant at the 0.01 level.** Significant at the 0.05 level.* Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 presents the results of the regression 
analysis according to models (3), (4) and (5). The 
coefficient of the explanatory variable ROA (panel A) 
that emerges on the basis of model (3) suggests a 
positive relationship between TAXA and firm 
profitability, whereas a negative association between 
TAXA and LEV was found, as documented by studies 
reported in section 2. Firms that have a higher value 
of TAXA also present a greater firm efficiency level, 
as shown by a significant positive coefficient of 
ATURN (panel A), but no statistically significant 
association was found between TAXA and CFINVA. 
These results are consistent with the assumption of 
a positive association between corporate tax burden 
and firm profitability. However, a statistically 
significant positive relationship between TAXA and 
CFINVA was found on the basis of model (4) when 
ROA was excluded from the analysis, as shown in 
panel B. Panel B of Table 5 also reports on a positive 
relationship between TAXA and firm profitability 
and efficiency, as measured by ROS and ATURN 
respectively, whereas a negative association between 
TAXA and LEV was confirmed, as in the preceding 
regression analysis. A weak positive association was 
also found with the firm’s size as measured by LNA. 
Regression results for model (5) presented in panel 
C of Table 5 confirm the role of ROA, ATURN and 
LEV in explaining the corporate tax burden as 
measured by TAXA when CFINVA was excluded from 
the explanatory variables. In sum, the relationship 
between corporate tax burden under income 
taxation and ROA resulting from model (4) appears 
similar to the relationship between the same 
corporate tax burden and CFINVA that emerges from 
model (5), suggesting that the corporate tax burden 
is justified by the presence of both ROA and CFINV.  
 
Table 5. OLS regression results of TAXA on various firm characteristics 
 
Panel A Estimate Std. Error t p-value  
const 0.0093427 0.00446259 2.0936 0.03769 ** 
ROA 0.0626453 0.0148237 4.2260 0.00004 *** 
ROS 0.000717171 0.000632137 1.1345 0.25808  
ATURN 0.00755362 0.00267442 2.8244 0.00527 *** 
LEV -0.0148295 0.00563561 -2.6314 0.00924 *** 
LNA 0.000331192 0.000427011 0.7756 0.43899  
CFINVA 0.0197195 0.0146298 1.3479 0.17937  
Panel B Estimate Std. Error t p-value  
const 0.00751729 0.0046428 1.6191 0.10715  
CFINVA 0.044844 0.0139727 3.2094 0.00157 *** 
ROS 0.00140802 0.000638289 2.2059 0.02864 ** 
ATURN 0.00832131 0.00278909 2.9835 0.00324 *** 
LEV -0.0197425 0.00576414 -3.4251 0.00076 *** 
LNA 0.000772712 0.000432784 1.7854 0.07585 * 
Panel C Estimate Std. Error t p-value  
const 0.00822396 0.00439456 1.8714 0.06289 * 
ROA 0.0707651 0.0135749 5.2129 <0.00001 *** 
ROS 0.000694134 0.000633322 1.0960 0.27452  
ATURN 0.00821319 0.00263517 3.1168 0.00213 *** 
LEV -0.0134211 0.00555032 -2.4181 0.01659 ** 
LNA 0.000395602 0.00042528 0.9302 0.35349  
Notes: Panel A, Adjusted R2 = 0.303; Panel B, Adjusted R2 = 0.238; Panel C, Adjusted R2 = 0.30. *** Significant at the 0.01 level.** 
Significant at the 0.05 level.* Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Using a sample of 189 Italian listed firms for the 
years 2011-2015, we examined how the cash flow 
net of cash from investing activities (CFINV) and the 
net income after taxes (NIAT) are correlated. Our 
study aims to provide insights into a cash-flow tax 
base as an alternative solution to the traditional 
income tax base.  
The research findings revealed three main 
results. First, the firms that could be disadvantaged, 
ceteris paribus, from a replacement of the income 
tax base with a cash-flow tax base are unprofitable 
and levered. More specifically, the analysis of the 
difference between CFINV and NIAT (DIFF) 
documented that firms have a positive amount of 
CFINV that is greater than the amount of NIAT for 
40.95% of the overall firm-year observations. 
Moreover, the logistic regression outlined that this 
margin is negatively affected by firm profitability, as 
measured by ROTA and ROS, and positively 
influenced by leverage as measured by LEV. Second, 
the cash-flow tax base as proxied by CFINV is on 
average associated ceteris paribus with firm 
profitability. More specifically, the OLS regression’s 
results revealed a significant positive relationship 
between the average value of CFINVA and ROA, 
though firm-year observations of CFINV and NIAT 
related to firm i were uncorrelated when the 
correlation coefficient was estimated (CORR = 0.273) 
over the period 2011-2015. A positive contribution 
of CFINVA was, moreover, due to firm efficiency as 
measured by ATURN and by firm leverage. Third, the 
corporate tax burden under income taxation is 
justified by the presence of both net income and 
CFINV. More specifically, research findings revealed 
positive correlations between corporate tax burden 
under income taxation and firm profitability and 
between the same corporate tax burden and CFINVA. 
Firm efficiency has also a positive role in affecting 
corporate tax burden, whereas leverage influenced it 
negatively. A similar association was found between 
corporate tax burden under income taxation and 
CFINVA when firm profitability, as measured by 
ROA, was excluded from the regression model.  
This study contributes to the extant literature 
by examining the correlation between proxy 
variables of the income tax base and the cash-flow 
tax base. In doing so, the present study attempts to 
throw a stone into the water by addressing some 
preliminary aspects of a complex debate that has led 
policy makers to a rethinking of the corporate tax 
base. However, this paper has several limitations. 
First, the firm sample includes only listed firms with 
the exclusion of unlisted companies, since data 
about measures of their cash flow were unavailable. 
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Second, research findings should be interpreted with 
some caution since measures of cash flow (CFINV) 
and net income (NIAT) that were available on 
databanks were computed after the payment of 
taxes. 
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